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Abstract 
Effective and efficient DoD acquisition programs require the analysis of a 
wide range of materiel alternatives. Diversity among alternatives, difficulties in 
selecting metrics and measuring performance, and other factors make the Analysis 
of Alternatives (AoA) difficult. The benefits of alternatives should be included in the 
AoA, but cost estimates dominate most AoA processes. Incorporating benefits into 
AoA is particularly difficult because of the intangible nature of many important 
benefits. The current work addresses the need to improve the use of benefits in AoA 
by building a system dynamics model of a military operation and integrating it with 
the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology. The synergies may be able to 
significantly improve the accuracy of KVA estimates in the AoA process. A notional 
mobile weapon system was modeled and calibrated to reflect four weaponized 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Modeling a hypothetical AoA for upgrading one of 
the UAV indicated that there were potentially significant synergies that could 
increase the number of alternatives that could be analyzed, establishing common 
units of benefit estimates for an AoA, improved reliability of an AoA, and improved 
justification of AoA results. These can improve alternative selection, thereby 
improving final materiel effectiveness, thereby improving the DoD acquisition 
processes.  
Keywords:  DoD acquisition programs, Alternative Diversity, Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA), Knowledge Value Added (KVA), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
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Introduction 
The U.S. defense acquisition process is initiated by the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which is one of the three major 
decision support systems used in the DoD to interconnect and arrive at a new 
warfighting capability. The JCIDS formulates force requirements with a “top down” 
approach that serves as both a Joint Force integrative process and one that can also 
hierarchically decompose the complexities of the battle spaces and their critical 
mission elements. It must also be aligned with the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) funding process as a way to descend 
from the strategic to the tactical in acquisition programs and budgets. Guidance from 
the current version of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 
3170.01g (2009, p. a-2 (8)) states,  
When a materiel solution is required by an approved ICD, the milestone 
decision authority (MDA) determines the scope of the subsequent analysis of 
alternatives (AoA), the appropriate entrance milestone, and designates the 
lead component(s) in a Materiel Development Decision (MDD). The purpose 
of the Materiel Solution Analysis phase is to assess potential materiel 
solutions and to satisfy the entrance criteria for the next program milestone as 
designated by the MDA. If the next phase per the MDA is Milestone (MS) A, 
then the ICD along with the results of the AoA form the basis for the MS A 
decision. 
JCIDS uses Capability-based Assessments (CBA) to validate capability gaps; 
to discover solutions such as those addressed by nonmateriel-type changes to 
doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, or facilities; or 
to pursue materiel solutions. Essential to CBA subprocesses is the knowledge of 
various functional warfighting Joint Capability Areas and how those communities 
operate within a joint paradigm. Functional Capability Boards are organized around 
top-tier functional areas such as Force Application, Logistics, etc.  
Once needs are specifically derived in an area, and it is ascertained that they 
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with either a variety of system types or technical approaches within a particular 
system type to fully address that capability need. An in-depth Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) helps sponsors and program managers compare options. 
Examples include manned or unmanned aircraft versus a missile, chemical energy 
versus kinetic energy kill mechanisms, etc. In the past, these have also been called 
Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses and cost-effectiveness analyses—all 
variants of a business case analysis.  
The focus of the current work is on improving the Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA) process that is used to make these major acquisition decisions. We will 
demonstrate the use of a system dynamics modeling approach that incorporates 
common units of benefits parameters using the KVA methodology and the potential 
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Problem Description 
In typical weapon system acquisition programs, there is a point at which  an 
AoA is conducted to select the most viable and cost-effective materiel solution so 
that it may be pursued into advanced development and production. Often a selection 
for advanced technical development among competitive system prototypes is 
needed, a practice that has recently become official DoD acquisition policy, but is 
not a new idea (USD[AT&L], 2007). 
System concepts are further clarified during the Materiel Solutions Analysis 
phase and the accompanying AoA process. As part of this process, programs move 
toward several kinds of evaluative cost comparisons that formulate costs estimates 
across a notional lifecycle. In these early stages, programs use analogous and 
parametric cost-estimation techniques. Parameters of system performance and key 
system characteristics are selected from technical and operational inputs. Usually 
several Key Performance Parameters included in the Initial Capability Document are 
used in the AoA to quantify points of differentiation.  
 Simulations help address uncertainty across likely operational contingencies 
(Ford & Dillard, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). Balancing of programmatic and operational 
risks should be accounted for, but costs predominate most analyses because, for 
major weapon systems, they can be huge. Not only must research and development 
costs be considered but also production costs and, beyond that, all of the operating 
costs of spares, diagnostics, maintenance, tools, training manuals, etc., must be 
estimated. The GAO Cost Estimation Guide (2009) states, 
For example, 10 U.S.C. § 2434 requires an independent cost estimate before 
a major defense acquisition program can advance into system development 
and demonstration or production and deployment. The statute specifies that 
the full life-cycle cost—all costs of development, procurement, military 
construction, and operations and support, without regard to funding source or 
management control—must be provided to the decision maker for 
consideration. In other cases, a program manager might want initially to 
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support to follow. However, if an estimate is to support the comparative AoA, 
all cost elements of each alternative should be estimated to make each 
alternative’s cost transparent in relation to the others. (p. 47)  
While the emphasis is clearly on cost in these stages, operational 
effectiveness must also be considered because that is where benefits are realized. 
Current guidance does not provide a method for estimating benefits in common 
units. Some feel that the emphasis is disproportionately on cost without enough 
emphasis on benefits. The GAO’s Cost Estimation Guide (2009) offers the following:  
AOA compares the operational effectiveness, suitability, and LCCE of 
alternatives that appear to satisfy established capability needs. Its major 
components are a CEA and cost analysis. AOAs try to identify the most 
promising of several conceptual alternatives; analysis and conclusions are 
typically used to justify initiating an acquisition program. An AOA also looks at 
mission threat and dependencies on other programs. When an AOA cannot 
quantify benefits, a CEA is more appropriate.  A CEA is conducted whenever 
it is unnecessary or impractical to consider the dollar value of benefits, as 
when various alternatives have the same annual monetary benefits. Both the 
AOA and CEA should address each alternative’s advantages, disadvantages, 
associated risks, and uncertainties and how they might influence the 
comparison [emphasis added]. (p. 35) 
The references here to benefits are primarily in the form of cost avoidance or 
cost savings. Clearly, these are not equivalent to normal estimates of benefits in the 
business world where revenue is the primary indicator of benefit and is not derived 
from the denominator or cost side of the equation. Monetizing benefits as some form 
of cost savings or avoidance leads to a slippery slope where the only indicator of 
value, or numerator in a productivity equation such as return on investment (ROI), is 
a derivative of the denominator, i.e., cost. Such predilections inevitably lead to the 
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Research Focus 
Benefits, in common units, should be included in AoA to enable higher fidelity 
comparisons among alternatives on the basis of value and not just cost. But how can 
sponsors and program managers best valuate very real and important but intangible 
benefits such as combat effectiveness, survivability, or national security? Lacking a 
credible ability to quantify such subjective or intangible benefits of the capabilities of 
a system type (or technical alternative) is a serious omission in any rigorous 
Analysis of Alternatives. The experience of Colonel Dillard, one of the authors of this 
report, includes several recent examples that illustrate the need for more than a 
conventional cost effectiveness analysis to defend a program requirement or a 
system parameter of technical capability. Often a particular system parameter of 
capability (e.g., weight, C-130 transportability, vertical take-off and landing) becomes 
a metric of program life and death, but with notably sparse articulation of empirical 
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The Case of the Javelin Anti-Tank Weapon System  
The Javelin anti-tank weapon system was, when it was conceptualized, 
merely named after its requirement as the Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System–
Medium (AAWS–M). In 1987–1989, the U.S. Army tested three competing 
technologies to fulfill the operational need for a one-man-portable anti-armor weapon 
system in the medium range (1,000–2,000 meter) category and to replace its aging 
and ineffective DRAGON weapon system. Principally, the weapon was to have the 
ability to defeat current and projected threat armored vehicles (including tanks); have 
a maximum range of at least 2,000 meters; weigh no more than 20.5 kg (with under 
15.5 kg being desirable); have the ability to be fired from enclosed spaces; and have 
the ability to engage armored vehicles under cover or in hull defilade. The U.S. 
Marine Corps agreed to these requirements, promising to pay for production items, 
but not to fund research and development. 
In August of 1986, “Proof of Principle” contracts of $30 million each were 
awarded to three competing contractor teams, spanning a 27-month period (the 
phase we now call “Technology Development”) to develop the technologies and 
conduct a “fly-off” missile competition. Each offered the needed capability solutions 
with differing technologies. Ford Aerospace teamed with its partner Loral Systems, 
offering a laser beam–riding missile. Hughes Aircraft teamed with Boeing to offer a 
fiber-optic guided missile. Texas Instruments teamed with Martin-Marietta, offering 
an imaging infra-red (I2R) or forward looking infra-red (FLIR) missile system. Each 
candidate system also offered some specific operational advantages and 
disadvantages that were almost impossible to quantify in terms of cost: 
• The Ford/Loral Laser Beam Rider required an exposed gunner and a 
man-in-loop throughout its rapid flight. It was the cheapest at an 
estimated $90,000 “cost per kill,” a figure that was comprised not only 
of average unit production cost estimates but also of reliability and 
accuracy estimates. It was fairly effective in terms of potential combat 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 8 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
• The Hughes/Boeing fiber-optic guided prototype enabled an 
unexposed gunner (once launched) and also required a man-in-loop 
throughout its slower flight. It was costlier, but less affected by range 
accuracy with its automatic lock-on and guidance in its terminal stage 
of flight—and it even offered target switching. It was also more gunner 
-training (learning) intensive, but could attack targets from above 
where their armor was thinnest. 
• The FLIR prototype offered completely autonomous “fire-and-forget” 
flight to target after launch and was perceived as both costliest and 
technologically riskiest. It would have been the easiest to train soldiers 
to use and would have been effective to maximum ranges by means of 
its target acquisition sensor and guidance packages. It was an 
outgrowth of a 1980 initiative by the Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency (DARPA) called Tank Breaker that also used “top 
attack” as a more effective means of armored target defeat. 
1988 was a busy year for the AAWS–M industry contractors as well as for the 
government acquirers and program sponsors. All three candidate teams finally 
began building and flight-testing their missile prototypes. They were also submitting 
their bids to the government’s Request for Proposal for the upcoming advanced 
development phase. On the government side, acquirers were evaluating these bids 
and preparing to award the 36-month Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) phase contract, while sponsors were completing a Cost and Operational 
Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) of the three candidate AAWS–M materiel solutions. 
Each of the teams enjoyed generally successful missile flight test outcomes as the 
Proof of Principle phase ended. Each flew over a dozen missiles and achieved a 
target hit rate of over 60%. 
The Laser Beam Rider candidate emerged as the winner of the COEA, 
presumably from weighted cost/efficiency factors. But in a strange twist, the Source 
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), which was deliberating concurrently, instead 
chose the FLIR candidate, presumably because of a bias toward “fire-and-forget.” As 
part of a typical capability formulation process, technical constraints are deliberately 
avoided in requirements documents to allow and encourage a maximum range of 
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gunner survivability were not stated requirements in the AAWS–M Joint Required 
Operational Capability document per se, fire-and-forget nevertheless translated into 
greatly enhanced gunner survivability and overwhelmingly appealed to user 
representatives (and government developers).  
The EMD contract was awarded in June 1989 to the Joint Venture team of 
Texas Instruments and Martin-Marietta. However, about 18 months into this 
program, serious technical problems doubled the expected cost of development and 
added about 18 more months to the originally planned 36 months to complete. This 
constituted a Nunn-McCurdy breach of cost and schedule thresholds, with requisite 
congressional notifications and formal rebaselining taking the better part of the next 
year to accomplish. Various technical issues plagued the program at this point, with 
system weight being perhaps chief among them.  User representatives convened a 
Joint Requirements Overview Council (JROC) to reevaluate the maximum weight 
requirement of 45 pounds and increased the program threshold to 49.5 pounds. 
Clearly, the Army and Marine Corps communities wanted the emergent system and 
its planned capabilities. But that didn’t resolve all of AAWS–M’s issues. 
During the months that the program teetered on the brink of termination for its 
technical and business issues, the director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE), as a principle member of the 
DAB, took the program to task, stating that if the FLIR version could not be shown 
able to achieve the same $90,000 cost per kill as had been estimated for the Laser 
Beam-Rider, then the program should be terminated and restarted, changing 
technologies and pursuing the less risky laser-guided version. The principal cost 
driver of the FLIR technology that enabled fire-and-forget was a 64x64 matrix (of 
heat detectors/pixels) focal plane array (FPA) to be manufactured by one of the Joint 
Venture partners. These tiny microchips would comprise almost 14% of the 
estimated average unit production cost (UPC) of the entire missile. The ability of one 
of the few producers in the world to manufacture them with economically sufficient 
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seemed, for a while, to hold the fate of the entire program. Intense scrutiny of 
projected yields and production costs of these critical components would determine 
whether the program was feasible from this aspect alone, some believed. But the 
answer was somewhat ambiguous, with roughly $12,000 being the target for 
average UPC, given a planned buy quantity of about 70,000. The cost of the FPAs 
wasn’t the only problem with them. But it turned out that their benefits could be 
described in a fairly tangible way. 
The AAWS–M FPA specifications were derived from a scenario-based target 
list of potential threat vehicles in different environments of atmospheric temperature, 
humidity, obscuration, etc. When the user community saw that early developmental 
AAWS–M focal plane arrays were not meeting the full specifications, they convened 
another JROC to allow stepped, incremental achievement of target defeat scenarios 
over time—something we would now refer to as evolutionary growth. They stratified 
performance in terms of levels A, B, and C to convey degrees of target defeat 
capability in focal plane arrays. This was a very unusual move by sponsors -- to 
dissect a requirement to accommodate the pace of technological achievement.1 This 
provided a qualitative assessment of what was achievable and satisfactory for 
system performance. Once again, the communities that needed AAWS–M’s 
capabilities were trying to ease the path forward.  
Fortunately, independent program evaluation teams also reported that FLIR 
technology was progressing and would be achievable within a rebaselined program. 
This joint position, along with wider program advocacy, curtailed the technical and 
business arguments and the fire-and-forget Javelin was allowed to proceed. An 
additional and more capable provider of FPAs was brought in and accelerated as a 
second source for this critical component. After difficult advanced development 
program challenges, AAWS–M eventually became the Javelin—and is known today 
                                            
1 This is perhaps not unlike today’s emergence of an Apple iPhone® being followed soon after by 
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as one of our most successful combat systems. (In the end, Soldiers and Marines 
never had to accept B- and C-level FPA performance because the full-capable FPA 
technology did, in fact, emerge in time for fielding. And system weight has been held 
just below 49.5 pounds throughout its many years of production.) 
There are many business and public policy lessons to be learned from the 
Javelin program. Within its long saga from initial concept to modern-day deployment 
and combat use are illustrations of requirements capture, early prototyping, 
technology readiness, modeling and simulation, economic forces of competition, 
acquisition strategy, decision bureaucracy, product discovery, economies of scale, 
etc. Perhaps the best lesson learned from the case presented here about analyzing 
alternatives is that a single, unstated, qualitative factor of performance (gunner 
survivability) ultimately drove the choice. Javelin had a requirements document with 
many pages of quantifiable requirements stated as measures of performance and 
effectiveness. But the parameter of system technology that promised the most of 
what was impossible to quantify became the overriding factor in the selection of 
alternatives. A magazine advertisement purchased by the Joint Venture shortly after 
their EMD contract win said it eloquently: “Fire & Forget AAWS–M: The Gunner 
Wins.” The failure of the Javelin program to move to the final solution faster and 
more directly was due in large part to the insufficient articulation of benefits as part 
of the Analysis of Alternatives process.  
Research Question 
As illustrated by the Javelin program, there is a basic need for the use of a 
common units-of-benefit estimate in the Analysis of Alternatives process. This 
should lead to including common units-of-benefit estimates as well as costs in the 
acquisition AoAs.  The problem is to develop a means to do this more effectively, 
given the nebulous nature of so many of the critical benefits of weapon systems. 
How can such a method be consistently applied to many alternatives across a wide 
range of operational conditions? The current research examines how KVA can be 
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benefit estimates that will improve the rigor of the AoA process and, thereby, 
improve acquisition processes.  
The goals of the current work are as follows:  
 Examine how military operations systems dynamics (SD) simulations 
can be combined with the KVA approach, 
 Identify potential advantages and disadvantages of integrating military 
operations simulations and the KVA approach, 
 Investigate the potential of exploiting the benefits from the synergy of 
SD and KVA to improve acquisition AoA processes, and 
 Identify and describe potential implications of the integration on 
acquisition practice. 
Due to the preliminary nature of this proof-of-concept study, precise 
descriptions of system operations are necessary. The focus is on the potential 
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Introduction to Knowledge Value Analysis 
In the U.S. Military context, the knowledge value added (KVA) methodology is 
a new way of approaching the problems of estimating the productivity (e.g., in terms 
of ROI) for military capabilities embedded in processes such as the CONOPS for a 
weapons system. In the current study, we posited several alternative CONOPS for a 
UAV system and used system dynamic modeling to evaluate their relative 
productivity. The KVA approach was used to estimate the parameters based on the 
system dynamic models by providing the estimates of the relative productivity (i.e., 
the ROI2) of each alternative. 
In a broader context, KVA also addresses the requirements of the many 
Department of Defense (DoD) policies and directives previously reviewed by 
providing a means to generate comparable value or benefit estimates for various 
processes and the technologies and people that execute them. It does this by 
providing a common and relatively objective means to estimate the value of new 
technologies as required in the following literature: 
 The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which mandates the assessment of 
the cost benefits for information technology investments; 
 The Government Accountability Office’s Assessing Risks and Returns: 
A Guide for Evaluating Federal Agencies’ IT Investment Decision-
Making (1997), which requires that IT investments apply ROI 
measures;  
 DoD Directive 8115.01, issued October 2005, which mandated the use 
of performance metrics based on outputs, with ROI analysis required 
for all current and planned IT investments; and 
 DoD Risk Management Guidance in the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, which requires that alternatives to the traditional cost 
                                            
2 ROI is defined as the revenue cost/cost, where revenue is defined as the price per common unit of 
benefit using a market comparables approach. Given that the price per common unit is a constant, 
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estimation be considered because legacy cost models tend not to 
adequately address costs associated with information systems or the 
risks associated with them.  
KVA is a methodology that describes all organizational outputs in common 
units. This provides a means to compare the outputs of all assets (human, machine, 
information technology), regardless of the aggregated outputs produced. Thus, it 
provides insights about the productivity level of processes, people, and systems in 
terms of a ratio of common units of output produced by each asset (a measure of 
benefits) divided by the cost to produce the output   By capturing the value of 
knowledge embedded in an organization’s core processes, employees, and 
technology, KVA identifies the actual cost and value of people, systems, or 
processes.  Because KVA identifies every process required to produce an output 
and the historical costs of those processes, unit costs and unit values of outputs, 
processes, functions, or services are calculated.  An output is defined as the end 
result of an organization’s operations; it can be a product or service, as shown in 
Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Measuring Output 
For the purpose of the systems dynamics model developed for this study, we 
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units. This allowed us to make their relative performance (e.g., productivity, ROIs) 
comparable. We used KVA to measure the value added by the human capital assets 
(i.e., military personnel executing the processes) and the system assets by 
analyzing the performances of the processes. KVA provided a means to set the 
systems dynamic model parameters so that the results would provide a way to 
compare the performance of various approaches to the system problem.  
By capturing the value of knowledge embedded in systems and in use in 
operators of the processes, KVA identified the productivity of the system-process 
alternatives. Because KVA identified every process output required to produce the 
final aggregated output, the common unit costs and the common unit values were 
estimated. This allowed for the benchmarking of various systems and the processes 
they supported with any other similar processes across the military.  
The KVA methodology has been applied in over 80 projects within the DoD, 
from flight scheduling applications to ship maintenance and from modernization 
processes to the current project analyzing several alternative approaches to the 
system alternatives problem. In general, the KVA methodology was used for this 
study because it could do the following:  
 Compare alternative approaches modeled with a systems dynamics 
model in terms of their relative productivity; 
 Allocate value and costs to common units of output; 
 Measure value added by the system alternatives based on the outputs 
each produced; and 
 Relate outputs to the cost of producing those outputs in common units. 
KVA quantifies value in two key productivity metrics: Return on Knowledge 
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Table 1. KVA Metrics 
Metric Description Type Calculation 






common units/cost to 
produce the output 









Based on the tenets of complexity theory, KVA assumes that both humans 
and technology in organizations add value by taking inputs and changing them into 
outputs (measured in common units of complexity)  through core processes. The 
amount of change an asset within a process produces can be described as a 
measure of value or benefit. The additional assumptions in KVA include the 
following: 
 Describes all process outputs in common units (e.g., using a 
knowledge metaphor for the descriptive language in terms of the time it 
takes an average employee to learn how to produce the outputs) and 
allows historical value and cost data to be assigned to those processes 
historically. 
 All outputs can be described in terms of the time required for a single 
point-of-reference learner to learn to produce them.  
 Learning Time, a surrogate for procedural knowledge required to 
produce process outputs, is measured in common units of time. 
Consequently, units of learning time are proportionate to common units 
of output.  
 Common units of output that make it possible to compare all outputs in 
terms of cost per unit as well as in terms of value (e.g., price) per unit 
because value (e.g., revenue) can now be assigned at the 
suborganizational level. 
 Assigns cost and revenue streams to suborganizational outputs, after 
which normal accounting and financial performance and profitability 
metrics can be applied (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995; Pavlou, Housel, 
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Describing processes in common units also permits, but does not require, 
market comparable data to be generated, which is particularly important for 
nonprofits like the U.S. Military. Using a market comparables approach, data from 
the commercial sector can be used to estimate price per common unit, allowing for 
revenue estimates of process outputs for nonprofits. This also provides a common 
units basis to define benefit streams regardless of the process analyzed.  
KVA differs from other nonprofit ROI models because it can allow for revenue 
estimates, enabling the use of traditional accounting, financial performance, and 
profitability measures at the suborganizational level. KVA can rank processes or 
process alternatives by their relative ROIs. This assists decision-makers in 
identifying how much of the various processes or process alternatives add value.  
In KVA, value is quantified in two key metrics: Return on Knowledge (ROK: 
revenue/cost) and ROI (revenue-investment cost/investment cost). The raw data 
from a KVA analysis can become the input into the ROI models and various 
forecasting techniques such as real options analysis, portfolio optimization, and 
Monte Carlo simulation. By tracking the historical volatility of price and cost per unit 
as well as ROI, it is possible to establish risk (as compared to uncertainty) 
distributions, which is important for accurately estimating the forecasted values for 
portfolio optimization and real options analysis. 
The KVA method has been applied to numerous military core processes 
across the Services. The KVA research has more recently provided a means for 
simplifying the input values for portfolio optimization and real options analysis for 
DoD processes and process assets. In the current work, KVA primarily provides a 
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Introduction to System Dynamics 
The system dynamics methodology applies a control theory perspective to the 
design and management of complex human systems. System dynamics combines 
servo-mechanism thinking with computer simulation to analyze systems. It is one of 
several established and successful approaches to systems analysis and design 
(Flood & Jackson, 1991; Jackson, 2003; Lane & Jackson, 1995). Forrester (1961) 
developed the methodology's philosophy, and Sterman (2000) specified the 
modeling process with examples and described numerous applications. The 
methodology has been extensively used for this purpose, including studying 
development projects. The system dynamics perspective focuses on how the 
internal structure of a system impacts system and managerial behavior and, thereby, 
performance over time. The approach is unique in its integrated use of stocks and 
flows, causal feedback, and time delays to model and explain processes, resources, 
information, and management policies. Stocks represent accumulations or backlogs 
of work, people, information, or other portions of the system that change over time. 
Flows represent the movement of those commodities into, between, and out of 
stocks. The methodology’s ability to model many diverse system components (e.g., 
work, people, money, value), processes (e.g., design, technology development, 
production, operations, quality assurance), and managerial decision-making and 
actions (e.g., forecasting and resource allocation) makes system dynamics useful for 
modeling and investigating military operations, the design of materiel, and 
acquisition.  
When applied to acquisition programs, system dynamics has focused on how 
performance evolves in response to interactions among development strategy (e.g., 
evolutionary development versus traditional), managerial decision-making (e.g., 
scope developed in specific blocks), and development processes (e.g., 
concurrence). System dynamics is appropriate for modeling acquisition because of 
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dynamics models of development projects are purposefully simple relative to actual 
practice in order to expose the relationships between causal structures and the 
behavior and performance that they create. Therefore, although many processes 
and features of system design and participants interact to determine performance, 
only those that describe features related to the topic of study are included. The 
importance of deleted features can be tested when system dynamics is used to test 
the ability of the model structure to explain system behavior and performance.  
System dynamics has been successfully applied to a variety of development 
and project management issues, including rework (Cooper, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c; 
Cooper & Mullen, 1993), the prediction and discovery of failures in project fast-track 
implementation (Ford & Sterman, 2003b), poor schedule performance (Abdel-
Hamid, 1988), tipping point structures in projects (Taylor & Ford, 2006, 2008), 
contingency management (Ford, 2002), resource allocation (Joglekar & Ford, 2005; 
Lee, Ford, & Joglekar, 2007), and the impacts of changes (Cooper, 1980), and 
concealing rework requirements on project performance (Ford & Sterman, 2003a). 
See Lyneis and Ford (2007) for a review of the application of system dynamics to 
projects and project management.  
System dynamics has also been applied to military systems, including 
planning and strategy (Bakken & Vamraak, 2003; Duczynski, 2000; McLucas, Lyell, 
et al., 2006; Melhuish et al., 2009), workforce management (Bell & Liphard, 1978), 
technology (Bakken, 2004), command and control (Bakken & Gilljam, 2003; Bakken 
et al., 2004), operations (Bakken et al., 2004; Coyle & Gardiner, 1991), logistics 
(Watts & Wolstenholme, 1990),  acquisition (Ford & Dillard, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; 
Bartolomei, 2001; Homer & Somers, 1988), and large system programs (Cooper, 
1994; Lyneis, Cooper, & Els, 2001). Coyle (1996) provides a survey of applications 
of system dynamics to military issues.  
Based on the literature described above and the authors’ experience with 
system dynamics, there appears to be an opportunity to exploit the capabilities of the 
system dynamics methodology to make the knowledge value added approach more 
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Research Methodology 
In the current work, KVA and system dynamics were integrated to test their 
ability to improve the precision of AoAs in acquisition programs. We first developed 
and tested a generic structure of a mobile weapon system process using the system 
dynamics methodology. Then we operationalized KVA value and cost estimates in 
the system dynamics model. The model was calibrated to reflect four extant 
weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). We used one of those calibrations 
as the basis for employing the model in a hypothetical AoA for upgrading the UAV to 
address a different type of target. We analyzed simulation results to test the ability of 
the system dynamics model to estimate benefits streams using KVA in terms of the 
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A Generic Model of Mobile Weapons Use 
The system dynamics model has three sectors: weapons movement, target 
evolution, and KVA analysis. As we will describe, the model structure simulates two 
critical aspects of mobile weapon system operations: (1) the support and movement 
of the weapon and (2) target evolution from identification through confirmation of 
destruction.  
The Weapons Movement Sector 
The Weapons Movement sector of the model simulates the positions and 
movements of weapons (e.g., individual UAVs or Javelin gunners). Figure 2 shows 
the positions that weapons (generically called assets) can take (boxes) and the rates 
of their movements from one position to another (arrows between boxes). We 
assumed that the total number of assets remained constant, i.e., no weapons were 
added or lost during operations. This assumption can be relaxed when modeling a 
specific asset. The movement of weapons is a subprocess of operating the weapon 
system that adds value and imbeds learning into tools, requires learning time for 
operators to be capable of performing and requires processing time to accomplish. 
Therefore, the completion of moving weapons to the station and back to the base is 
an output of that subprocess and an input to the KVA analysis. The combination of 
the two movements “Assets arrive at station rate” and “Assets arriving as base rate” 
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Figure 2. Positions and Movement of Weapons During Operations 
Each rate in the weapons sector describes the average movement of the 
weapons in the accumulation that precedes the rate. Each rate is defined with the 
number of weapons preparing for that rate (to leave base or station) or event (to 
arrive at station or base) and the average time spent by a weapon in the preceding 
accumulation. For example, the (average) “Assets leaving base for station” rate is 
equal to the number of assets at the base divided by the average time that a weapon 
spends at the base between trips to the station. This formulation increases the 
average departure rate with more weapons at the base and decreases the average 
departure rate if weapons stay at the base longer. The average time at the base is 
characteristic of particular assets and can generate different behaviors and 
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The Target Evolution Sector  
The Target Evolution sector of the model simulates the development of 
targets through five subprocesses of system operations:  
1. Acquire target—includes detection, recognition, location, classification 
(identification), and confirmation (Global Security, 2010).  
2. Fire support coordination—allocates targets to weapons by a group of 
people that have access to information about the battlefield situation 
and about doctrine, major systems, significant capabilities and 
limitations, and often their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) 
(Williams, 2001). 
3. Fire mission development—prepares specific instructions and target 
information for transmission to the weapons team and to the weapon 
(e.g., target location coordinates).  
4. Engage target—weapons operators (e.g., pilots for UAV) maneuver the 
weapon within striking distance of the target, enter the target 
coordinates, and launch munitions.  
5. Battlefield assessment—often the same asset as was used for target 
acquisition is used to evaluate the success of engagement in 
destroying the target. 
In the model, targets evolve through these stages in an “aging chain” 
structure of sequential accumulations (backlogs + work in progress, referred to here 
as backlogs) and (sub)processes that drain those backlogs and contribute to the 
backlog of the next downstream subprocess. Figure 3 shows the conditions of 
targets (boxes) and the rates of their movements from one condition to another 
(arrows between boxes) due to subprocesses. The movements “Acquire target 
completion rate,” “Fire support coordination to asset,” “Fire mission completion rate,” 
“Engage target,” and “Battlefield assessment rate” are subprocesses that add value, 
imbed learning in tools, require learning time for operators to be capable of 
performing and require processing time to complete. Therefore, they are each 






















































Figure 3. Accumulations and Movements of Targets in Weapon  
System Operations 
In addition to the primary flows of targets through the subprocesses, the 
target sector models three common causes of mission failure: (1) hitting the target 
but failing to destroy it, (2) missing the target, and (3) missing the target and losing 
the location information needed to engage the target again (e.g., because the target 
moved). Each cause moves the target to a different condition in the target aging 
chain. Hitting the target but failing to destroy it (e.g., a hardened target) requires 
reengagement, but often no additional targeting information. After Battlefield 
assessment, these targets are returned to the Target engagement backlog. Missing 
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re-aim the weapon prior to reengagement. Therefore, these targets are returned to 
the Targets in fire mission development backlog after Battlefield assessment. Losing 
the target (e.g., a fast-moving vehicle) requires that the target be reacquired. 
Therefore, these targets are returned to the Targets being acquired backlog after 
Battlefield assessment.  
In a manner similar to the modeling of the movement of weapons, the rates in 
the target sector describe the average movement of targets between backlogs. The 
primary rates in the aging chain are defined by the number of targets in the backlogs 
of the subprocess and the average time required to perform the subprocess. The 
average time required to perform the subprocess is characteristic of particular 
subprocesses (e.g., different engagement durations for different weapons) and can 
generate different behavior and performance across weapons and configurations. 
When two or more flows drain a backlog (Targets in fire support coordination and 
Battlefield assessment backlog), the total outflow is split between the flows using a 
percent that leaves the stock through each outflow. The return flows are each a 
fraction of the Battlefield assessment rate. Those fractions are based on the ability of 
the weapon to successfully destroy, hit, and not lose targets. Therefore, like in 
practice, different weapon alternatives (e.g., range, payload, dash speed) impact 
mission success. The Using System Dynamics and KVA to Improve Analysis of 
Alternatives section of this report describes how these features of the model were 
used to describe operational scenarios and weapon configurations. The fractions of 
the Battlefield assessment rate that was returned to the engagement backlog due to 
being hit but not destroyed, was missed and returned to the mission development 
backlog, or was lost and returned to the target acquisition backlog are described with 
the probability of destruction if the target is hit with the ordinance (p(kill if hit) or 
p(kill)), the probability of the weapon hitting the target with ordinance (p(hit)), and the 
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respectively.3 These probabilities are determined by comparing the ability of a 
weapon to successfully destroy, hit, and not lose targets to the characteristics of the 
target. More specifically, the probability of kill is modeled with the weapon’s payload 
compared to the lethal payload (i.e., ordinance size required to kill); probability of hit 
is modeled with the weapon’s dash speed compared to the target’s speed; and the 
probability of not losing the target is modeled with the weapon’s range compared to 
the target’s distance from the base. Therefore,  
p(kill) = fk(Payload / Lethal payload) 
p(hit) = fh(Dash speed / Target speed) 
p(not lose) = fnl(Range / Target distance from base) 
where, 
p(kill):  probability of destruction if the target is hit with the ordinance 
p(hit):  probability of the weapon hitting the target with ordinance 
p(not lose):  probability of not losing the target if it is missed with the 
ordinance 
 
The three functions that estimate the probabilities based on the ratios are 
assumed to be simple but realistic relations that include the entire range of possible 
conditions.4 The function relating the Payload/Lethal payload ratio to the probability 
of kill is assumed to increase linearly from p(kill)=0 when the ratio is zero (i.e., no 
payload prevents any chance of target destruction) to p(kill)=100% when the ratio is 
greater than or equal to 1 (i.e., if the payload exceeds the lethal payload, the target 
is assumed to be destroyed if it is hit). The function relating the Dash speed/Target 
speed ratio to the probability of the weapon hitting the target with ordinance 
assumes that the vehicle will “chase” a moving target and that the faster the vehicle 
is, the closer it can get to the target before releasing ordinance—increasing the 
                                            
3 The probability of not losing a target is used instead of the probability of losing a target to retain a 
“bigger is better” standard for all three measures and, therefore, to facilitate intuitive understanding of 
the model.  
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likelihood of hitting the target with the ordinance. However, there is always some 
possibility of missing a target, even if the vehicle is faster than the target and, 
therefore, close to the target. The function is assumed to have an elongated S shape 
from p(hit)=0 when the ratio is zero (i.e., no Dash speed prevents hitting the target) 
to p(hit)=90% when the ratio is greater than or equal to three (i.e., high likelihood of 
hit if the weapon speed far exceeds target speed.5 The function relating the 
Range/Target distance from base ratio to the probability of not losing the target if it is 
missed with the ordinance assumes that the vehicle will move toward the target but 
that the target may also move, sometimes closer to the vehicle and sometimes away 
from it. When the target moves away from the vehicle, it may move out of the 
vehicle’s range, causing the vehicle to lose the target. The function is assumed to 
have a stretched out S shape from p(not lose)=0 when the ratio is zero (i.e., no 
weapon range causes the vehicle to always lose the target) to p(not lose)=95% 
when the ratio is greater than or equal to 1.8, reflecting some chance of losing the 
target even if it is well within the vehicle’s range.   
The KVA Sector 
The KVA metrics were fully operationalized within the system dynamics 
model. The KVA sector uses operations information from the weapons and targets 
sectors of the model and characteristic descriptors of weapons to generate relative 
value metrics for each subprocess (including weapons capability outputs) of the UAV 
operations. KVA generates a productivity ratio that reflects output/input. If 
monetized, this ratio can be a traditional benefit-cost ratio (e.g., ROI if benefits are 
monetized as a form of revenue surrogate). Other measures of benefits and costs 
can also be used—as long as there are common units in the numerator (benefits) 
and all the cost units of all the contributors to the denominator are the same (as is 
most often the case because costs are almost always monetized)—so they can each 
                                            
5 The assumed function relating the Dash Speed/Target Speed to the probability of hitting the target is 
probably lower than current experience, but is used to reflect the change in targets described in the 
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be aggregated. At each point in time, each subprocess’s productivity is the benefits it 
has generated divided by the costs of generating those benefits (i.e., 
output/input).The model includes both monetized and time-based KVA metrics.  
Monetized KVA Metrics 
When monetized, the numerator (benefits) for each subprocess is the 
accumulation across operations of a fraction of the value added by one complete 
operation (e.g., in this case it would be the monetary value of the destruction of a 
target). The fraction allocated to each subprocess is directly proportional to the 
Learning time required to produce the outputs of the subprocess, in common units of 
learning time. Learning time captures the benefits derived from human processing 
(e.g., flying the vehicle), automated processes (e.g., takeoffs and landings), and 
(importantly) technologies integrated into the weapon. The denominator of 
monetized subprocess KVA productivities is the accumulation across operations of 
the costs incurred to perform the subprocess. How these were modeled is described 
next. 
The benefit generated by a weapon system is the destruction of targets. That 
benefit can be monetized with an estimate of the value (in monetary terms) of the 
destruction of a typical or average target. This value can be estimated with the cost 
that the government would have to pay a private entity to perform the same task 
without the use of the weapon system (e.g., using a land-based operation instead of 
an aircraft or missile). The benefits generated by each subprocess are a fraction of 
the total benefits that the operation has accumulated so far. That fraction is modeled 
as being directly proportional to the learning times (reflecting complexity as a 
common units measure of value added) of the subprocesses. Those total benefits of 
a subprocess are the accumulation over time of the product of the subprocess’s 
portion of the benefits for a single target and the rate at which the subprocess is 
being performed. Based on this, a set of equations for estimating the benefits of a 
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Unit subprocess benefit fraction = Subprocess learning time /  
Total of all subprocess learning times 
 
Unit subprocess benefit = Unit subprocess benefit fraction *  
Unit benefit for entire process 
 
Rate of subprocess generating revenue = Subprocess processing rate *  
Unit subprocess benefit   
 
Subprocess benefits generated to date = ∑(Rate of subprocess generating  
     benefits) * dt  
 
where, 
dt:  timestep, the period over which the argument is integrated  
 
The denominator of KVA subprocess productivity ratios represents 
subprocess costs. The cost to date at any time is modeled as the product of the time 
required to perform the subprocess and the average hourly cost of performing the 
subprocess. The total time spent performing a subprocess at any given time is the 
product of the average time required for the subprocess and the number of 
performances of the subprocess. Therefore, a set of equations for estimating the 
costs of a single subprocess in each time period are as follows: 
Rate of spending time on subprocess performance =  
Subprocess performance rate *   
time required to perform the subprocess 
 
Subprocess work time spent to date = 
∑ (Rate of spending time on subprocess performance) * dt  
 
Subprocess processing time generated to date =  
Subprocess work time spent to date * Hourly performance cost 
 
 
In each time period, subprocess benefits and costs are combined into 
subprocess KVA productivity ratios.  
Subprocess productivity = Subprocess benefits generated to date /  
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The calculation of monetary KVA metrics has been incorporated into the 
system dynamics model. However, the modelers decided that the current model 
would be simpler to interpret by using the non-monetized common units of output (as 
described in terms of the units of time it would take the average person to learn how 
to produce the outputs) as the numerator. This results in a standard definition of 
productivity (output/input).  
Time-Based KVA Metrics 
Calculating the learning time–based KVA metrics applies the same approach 
as the monetized metrics, but uses Learning Time to quantify benefits and Touch 
Time to quantify costs instead of money. One of several ways to quantify a 
subprocess’s Learning Time is to estimate the average time required for a common 
point-of-reference learner to be trained and become competent in performing the 
subprocess. Each subprocess is assigned a unit learning time that reflects the 
relative (compared to other subprocesses) complexity of the subprocess. Each 
subprocess is also assigned a Unit Touch Time that reflects the relative (compared 
to other subprocesses) effort required to perform the subprocess. These are 
aggregated over many operations and compared in order to generate a 
subprocess’s productivity ratio. The equations for modeling time-based KVA metrics 
for a subprocess are as follows:   
Subprocess learning Time accumulated to date =  
∑ (Rate of subprocess operation * Subprocess unit learning time) * dt  
 
Subprocess touch time accumulated to date =  
∑ (Rate of subprocess operation * Subprocess unit touch time * dt 
 
Subprocess Productivity = Subprocess learning time accumulated to date /  
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Learning Times and Touch Times are also aggregated across subprocesses 
in order to estimate the productivity of the entire operation. This allows the 
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A Brief Introduction to Weaponized Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have a long history, dating from their use 
as targeting drones in the 1920s (Jones, 1997). They have evolved into 
reconnaissance assets, valuable particularly where air space is considered too 
dangerous for manned aircraft. Other advantages, such as the ability to remain on 
station for extended periods of time, reduced mission costs, and access to space 
denied to manned aircraft, have been exploited in more recent UAVs. In the DoD, 
UAVs are divided into three classes:  
 Close Range UAVs (UAV-CR) that operate within a range of about 50 
kilometers;  
 Short Range UAVs (UAV-SR) with 8-10–hour flight durations, a range 
of 200 kilometers, and the ability to communicate through a datalink; 
and  
 Endurance UAVs (UAV-E) with at least 24-hour flight durations and the 
ability to perform multiple missions simultaneously. 
Weaponized UAVs were developed and used in the Vietnam War. The Navy’s 
DASH UAV helicopter carried two 250-pound torpedoes that were used to destroy 
North Vietmanese supply barges in the Mekong Delta waterways after detection by 
the vehicle’s television camera (Global Security, 2010). However, technical and 
other limitations prevented the further operationalization of weaponized UAVs for 
several decades. Several weaponized UAVs are now operational, including the MQ-
1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and Sky Warrior, with the last two being decedents of the 
Predator. Other weaponized UAVs are under development, including the X-45B 
(also known as the Unmanned Combat Air System–Navy or UCAS–N) by Northrop 
Grumman (Figure 4) that will include aircraft carrier suitability (Cayas, 2007), and is 
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Model Calibration and Testing 
The KVA+SD model was calibrated to the operations of four actual 
weaponized UAVs. The operations included the following subprocesses: 
1. acquire target, 
2. fire support coordination, 
3. fire mission development, 
4. move weapons, 
5. engage targets, and 
6. perform battlefield assessments. 
Three of the four UAVs are operational: Predator, Sky Warrior, and Reaper. 
The fourth UAV is the X-47B. The modelers collected basic characteristics relating to 
UAV performance for the four UAVs from publicly available sources (such as Global 
Security, 2010). That information included vehicle range, total mission time, time on 
station, dash speed, and payload. The DoD has developed multiple versions of 
some of the vehicle with different characteristics. In these cases, a single version 
was selected and used. Other information was estimated for each vehicle’s 
operations, including learning and processing times for each subprocess. 
Reasonable assumptions were used in making these estimates; for example, we 
made the assumption that the time required to engage a target after arriving on 
station was inversely proportional to the vehicle’s dash speed (i.e., faster dash 
speeds reduced the time required to engage). These estimates were rough but 
adequate for this proof-of-concept study, which sought to determine if the model was 
capable of reflecting differences in characteristics in KVA parameters, not whether it 
was capable of predicting actual outcomes.  
The model was tested using standard tests for system dynamics models 
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actual system, reasonable behavior over a wide range of input values, and behavior 
similarity to actual systems. Basing the model structure on previously validated 
models and the literature improves the model’s structural similarity to actual 
acquisition projects. Model behavior (e.g., simulated sizes of backlogs for 
subprocesses and rates of performing operations) was compared to typical behavior 
and found to be similar. For example, before operations started at the beginning of 
the operational scenario (described in what follows), the backlogs were empty and 
no operations were being performed. The appearance of targets increased 
subprocess backlogs and rates of operation as weapons left base and subsequently 
arrived on station, acquired targets, coordinated fire, developed missions, engaged 
targets, and assessed the battlefield. Figure 5 shows an example of these simulated 





0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
Time (Minute)
Targets being acquired : Predator-Base Case targets
Targets in fire support coordination : Predator-Base Case targets
Targets in fire mission development : Predator-Base Case targets
Target engagement backlog : Predator-Base Case targets
Targets in battlefield assessment backlog : Predator-Base Case targets
 
NOTE: Target Backlog is measured in the number of targets 
Figure 5. Backlogs in the Target Evolution Sector—Predator UAV  
Base Case 
In the evolution of targets, these backlogs and subprocesses increase 
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slows as capacities adjust to demand (backlog sizes) until the operations are in 
dynamic equilibrium conditions, with sizes of backlogs and operations rates 
remaining within a relatively narrow range. This represents “steady state” operations 
that could be continued for a significant period of time, e.g., until damage to 
weapons or maintenance (not included in the current model) changes weapon 
availability. Model behavior was also tested with extreme input values such as 
perfect operations (e.g., probability of hit=100%) and a very large versus very small 
number of weapons and targets as well as with more typical conditions. Model 
behavior remained defensible across wide ranges of input values, including extreme 
values. These tests increased modeler confidence that the model generates realistic 
operational behavior patterns due to the same causal relations found in the type of 
operations investigated (i.e., generates “the right behavior for the right reasons”).  
The operational scenario was described with the quantity and characteristics 
of the targets.6 A stream of targets entered the target acquisition backlog at a steady 
rate of five targets per minute. The target distance from the base was assumed to 
vary uniformly from 400–1,100 nm. This distance described targets including those 
that were closer to the weapon’s base than the shortest weapon’s range to targets 
that were farther from the base than the longest weapon’s range. The speed of the 
targets was assumed to vary uniformly from 50 to 250 nm. This described targets 
from those that were almost immobile to targets that were faster than the fastest 
weapon modeled. The payload required to destroy the target if hit (i.e., lethal 
payload) was assumed to vary uniformly from 400 to 1,000 lbs. This described 
targets from those that were very soft to targets that were very hardened. 
KVA productivities for the six subprocesses and the cumulative productivity of 
those processes for the four weaponized UAVs are shown in Table 2. Each KVA 
                                            
6 Although a single operational environment was simulated for this research, multiple and different 
environments can be simulated. Examples of characteristics of the operational scenario that can be 
elaborated include dynamic variation in the entering target rate, distributions of target characteristics, 
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productivity ratio is described as the integer resulting from dividing the benefits (in 
Learning Time) by the cost (in Touch time). For example,, for the Fire Mission 
Development subprocess for the four UAVs those ratios are  943 (Predator), 3,122 
(Reaper), 1,222 (Sky Warrior), and 3,962 (X-47B). They represent the benefits 
(output) per unit of cost (input) and, therefore, can also be interpreted as a measure, 
in percentages, of the return on the investment. These values remained constant in 
the model after steady state operations had been established. As an example of the 
components of the ratios, the Fire Mission Development subprocess ratio for the 
Predator (943) is the quotient of the accumulated benefits (e.g., after five hours of 
operations) of 79,684 learning-time hours and 84.5 processing-time hours. In the 
simulated steady state operations, these accumulated learning-time hours increased 
at a rate of 301 learning-time hours per minute (the product of the estimated 500 
learning-time hours per fire development operation and an average fire development 
rate of 0.6 targets developed per minute), and the processing-time hours increased 
at a rate of 0.3 hours per minute (the product of the estimated 30-minute processing 
time to develop a fire mission and the same average fire development rate of 0.6 
targets developed per minute). Transitional periods (e.g., the start or end of 
operations) or other nonsteady state operations can generate ratios that vary over 
time.  




Acquire targets 377 377 377 377
Fire support coordination 189 189 189 189
Fire mission development 943 3122 1222 3962
Move weapons 50 23 44 607
Engage targets 5094 70761 15212 254736
Battlefield assessment 377 377 377 377
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Note that, as described in The KVA Sector section, these productivities are 
ratios of accumulated learning time divided by accumulated processing time. 
Therefore, they are relative values. As expected, the three productivities for the 
subprocesses that were not impacted by the characteristics of the vehicle (acquire 
targets, fire support coordination, and battlefield assessment) did not change. These 
subprocesses were not impacted by different vehicles because the subprocess was 
the same for all of these vehicles. The application of system dynamics and KVA to 
the Analysis of Alternatives of other system alternatives—such as improved logistics 
or vehicle technology used for recognizing and indentifying targets—would generate 
changes in these KVA productivities. However, three important subprocesses that 
impacted total product productivity (see the row titled Weapon in Table 2) did vary 
(fire mission development, move weapons, and engage targets).  
Some of the ratios in Table 2 are relatively large when compared to returns 
on investment experienced in many industries, especially for the Engage targets 
subprocess. A primary reason is that the numerator of these ratios includes the 
benefits of the technologies incorporated into the UAV for target engagement 
purposes. These technologies are extremely complex, are reflected in very large 
learning-time hours that are accumulated each time a target is engaged, and, 
therefore, generate high productivity ratios. Similarly, the denominator of these ratios 
reflects the time required to perform the subprocess, e.g., engage a target after it 
has been acquired, coordinate fire support, develop fire missions, and move UAVs 
to stations. Actual engagement times are relatively short for these UAVs, further 
increasing the KVA productivity ratios for the engage target subprocess. Differences 
in learning times across the UAVs reflect their relative performance (e.g., the 
automation of subprocesses previously performed by humans).  Technologies are 
the primary causes of differences in the ratios across the UAVs in Table 2. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that the very large benefits of the X-47B, with its 
extremely advanced technology, generate the largest ratios. Improved estimates of 
learning times and processing times can increase the accuracy of these ratios. 
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subprocess with the ratios for the move weapons subprocess, which is simpler 
(lower numerator) and takes longer (larger denominator), indicates that the rank 
order of the ratios reflects the relative returns of the different subprocesses.  
Based on these and additional tests, the model is considered useful for the 
investigation of the integration of system dynamics and KVA. Table 2 indicates that 
the X-47B is the most efficient (generates more benefits for given costs). The next 
section uses the model to generate a deeper understanding of how subprocesses 
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Using System Dynamics and KVA to Improve 
Analysis of Alternatives 
Consider the following hypothetical example of the use of an integrated 
system dynamics/KVA model to improve the productivity estimates supporting an 
Analysis of Alternatives. Assume that a new version of the Predator UAV is being 
developed to enable it to engage opposing UAVs. Due to the much higher speeds 
and agility of UAVs compared to most land-based targets, the fraction of targets 
missed is expected to be higher than that currently experienced with the Predator. 
The acquisition program management team has access to some, albeit limited, 
resources (e.g., money, expert developer time until required delivery, technology 
development capabilities, approvals) to improve performance. Different stakeholders 
value payload, dash speed, and range differently and want the program 
management to recommend different improvements. Therefore, program 
management expects a rigorous review of its Analysis of Alternatives process and 
the results that will recommend one (and only one) of the improvements. As part of 
the justification of the AoA decision, stakeholders of the two solutions not 
recommended are certain to require explanations of how and how much the 
recommended improvement will impact operational performance compared to the 
improvements that were not recommended. Cost would, most likely, be their primary 
economic consideration, as evidenced by the earlier case-study examples. However, 
our analysis will focus on value compared to cost in terms of the capabilities of the 
systems. 
Many alternatives have been proposed and are being considered. A few 
examples are7:   
                                            
7 There are interdependencies and trade-offs in these alternatives, such as needing to increase the 
size of the power plant to maintain a given dash speed if the size of the fuel tank is increased. These 
are ignored here for simplicity. However, in an application to an actual program, developers would 
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 Increase the size of the power plant, which can be used to increase the 
vehicle’s payload, dash speed, or a combination of both. This requires 
an increase in fuel capacity in order to not reduce range.  
 Redesign the transmission, which will increase the vehicle’s dash 
speed.  
 Increase the fuel tank size, which will increase the vehicle’s range but 
decrease its dash speed unless the power plant is also increased.  
 Reduce the time required at base between trips to station, which will 
increase the time that the vehicle is on station and available for 
missions. 
Performing detailed analyses of all the possible alternatives, such as by 
building and testing prototypes or very detailed simulations, can exceed the 
resources of acquisition programs. Therefore, program managers may be faced with 
the challenge of reducing a long list of potential alternatives to those that should 
definitely be included in the program, those that should be investigated further for 
potential inclusion, and those that should be rejected. The integration of system 
dynamics and KVA provides a timely and inexpensive means of evaluating all 
potential alternatives and reducing the long list of potential alternatives to a short list 
to be pursued or investigated further based on an objective and justifiable process. 
To do this, the operation of the system with each potential alternative must first be 
simulated. This simulation can provide insight into system operations based on 
different investment decisions. For example, Figure 6 shows the simulated evolution 
of the backlog of targets waiting for engagement based on three investment choices: 
an increased power plant that doubles the allowable payload (100% power plant 
payload), a Predator without improvement (Predator base case), and a redesigned 
transmission that doubles the vehicle’s dash speed (100% faster dash speed). 
These can be used to improve CONOPS (e.g., the number of different types of 














































Target Engagement Backlog : Predator-+100% Power plant-payload 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Target Engagement Backlog : Predator-Base Case 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Target Engagement Backlog : Predator--100% faster dash speed 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  
Figure 6. Engagement Backlog Evolution for Five Predator  
Investment Choices 
The simulations can also be used to calculate the KVA productivity ratios for 
the subprocesses and for the system as a whole. Table 3 provides an example of a 
portion of such an analysis for the hypothetical upgrading of the Predator UAV using 
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Predator base Case 943 50 5,094 705 0%
Increase fuel capacity 100% 1,886 50 5,094 951 35%
Increase fuel capacity 50% 1,415 50 5,094 831 18%
Increase power plant 50% 
for payload
943 51 7,641 796 13%
Increase power plant 100% 
for dash speed
943 100 10,188 741 5%
Redesign transmission for 
100% faster dash speed
943 78 10,188 731 4%
Increase power plant 50% 
for dash speed
943 75 7,641 727 3%
Increase power plant 100% 
for payload
943 50 10,188 722 2%
Redesign transmission for 
50% faster dash speed
943 78 7,641 717 2%
Reduce time at base 50% 943 50 5,094 699 ‐1%














KVA Productivity Ratios for Analysis of Alternatives 
The KVA productivity ratios are repetitive for some subprocesses across 
alternatives. This is partially because some alternatives do not change the impact on 
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interactions incorporated into this proof-of-concept model. However, the results from 
using an integrated system dynamics/KVA model are adequate to show how more 
accurate results might be used in an AoA of potential capabilities upgrades. Based 
on the results above, a program manager can assess the relative value added by 
the eleven alternatives (including no change, as reflected by the Base Case) 
analyzed. A comparison to the base case (e.g., the existing vehicle in the case of the 
Predator upgrade) provides an estimate of relative performance improvement. By 
sorting the improvements provided by potential alternatives in decreasing order 
(Table 3), we created a list of alternatives from most attractive (increase fuel 
capacity 100%) to least attractive (reduce time at base 50%). The AoA suggests that 
if adequate resources are available, then the alternative that improves the system 
the most is to increase the fuel capacity 100% because it improves the development 
of the fire missions. If inadequate resources are available to implement this 
alternative, then the program should attempt to increase the fuel capacity by 50% for 
similar reasons. The program manager can also remove from consideration reducing 
the time at the base and a 50% increase in power plant capacity that would be used 
to increase dash speed because they do not improve performance. Certainly other 
factors must be incorporated into a complete AoA (most notably development costs), 
but the results of the KVA analysis using the system dynamics model provide 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Summary 
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) approach to including benefits in an 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was integrated with a system dynamics model of 
weapon systems operations to investigate the potential of their integration to 
improve the accuracy of KVA productivity ratios and, thereby, AoA. An integrated 
model was developed for a generic mobile weapons system and calibrated to four 
existing weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Six basic subprocesses of 
operations using the weapons were included in the simulation. KVA productivity 
ratios for each subprocess for each UAV were calculated, compared, and used to 
explain how the simulation and KVA approach work together to generate quantitative 
assessments of the relative value added of each subprocess and whole weapon 
system. A hypothetical upgrade program to one of the UAVs was also simulated to 
demonstrate how the integrated model can be used to evaluate alternative upgrades 
and justify AoA decisions.  
Evaluation of Results  
An Analysis of Alternatives based on an integrated system dynamics/KVA 
model provides program management teams with several kinds of valuable 
information:   
 Quantified Measures of Improvement that include Benefits: 
Measures of subprocesses and the weapon system as a whole are 
quantified using a common set of assumptions and values (those 
incorporated into the simulation model). Therefore, differences in ratios 
and the implied relative value of different alternatives are due to the 
differences in the alternatives themselves.  
 Overall System Improvement Estimates: The weapon (versus the 
subprocess) -productivity ratios reflect changes in total product 
operations. If adequate resources are available to adopt at least one 
alternative, then a list of alternatives ranked by overall system 
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those that should definitely be pursued, those that require more 
investigation before deciding, and those that should be abandoned. 
For example, the right-hand column in Table 3 suggests that 
increasing the fuel capacity should be pursued before redesigning the 
transmission and that reducing the time at the base should not be 
considered further.  
 Guidance for Alternative Selection: The analysis specifically 
identifies which alternatives improve which subprocesses and the 
whole weapon system and by how much. For example, Table 3 
suggests that increasing fuel capacity increases the Fire mission 
development subprocess most, and three alternatives significantly 
improve the engage target subprocess most.  
 Justification of Analysis of Alternatives Decisions: When used with 
the simulation model, the KVA productivity ratios can help explain and 
justify Analysis of Alternatives decisions by providing a means of 
describing how each alternative impacts operations, subprocesses, 
and performance. For example, in the UAV case above, increasing 
power plant size increases the payload, which increases the 
payload/lethal payload ratio, which increases the probability of 
destruction if hit (p(kill)), which decreases the return flow “Incomplete 
kill rate” from the Battlefield Assessment Backlog to the Target 
engagement backlog (Figure 3). This reduces the average number of 
times that a target must be engaged in order to be destroyed, thereby 
improving the productivity of the engage target subprocess. 
 Guidance for Further Investigation: In addition to suggesting better 
and worse alternatives to pursue, an integrated system dynamics/KVA 
model can provide guidance for further investigation of alternatives by 
indicating which subprocesses each alternative improves. For 
example, Table 3 indicates that the reason that increasing fuel capacity 
improves performance is that it improves the Fire mission development 
subprocess. The model (Figure 3) indicates that this occurs by 
increasing the vehicle range, which reduces the likelihood of losing a 
target if it is missed with ordinance. Acquisition program managers can 
use this information to focus further investigation and development of 
this alternative on fire mission development to assure that these 
improvements in the specific operations identified with the model are 
realized during the alternative’s development.   
It is important to note that neither a system dynamics model nor a KVA 
analysis of this system alone can reasonably produce these results. Only by 
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available. Based on the modeling and assessment above, we conclude that 
integrated system dynamics/KVA models can significantly improve the Analysis of 
Alternatives and, thereby, acquisition.  
Implications for Practice 
The current work indicates that acquisition can be improved by using 
integrated system dynamics/KVA models in the Analysis of Alternatives. The 
rigorous development and use of integrated system dynamics/KVA models can have 
important implications for acquisition practice, including the following:   
 The number of alternatives that can be analyzed with KVA can be 
increased due to the relative ease of reflecting alternatives in the 
operations simulation model compared to manually developing 
forecasts for use in KVA analysis. This increases the likelihood of 
identifying and selecting the optimal alternative.  
 Justifications of AoA decisions can become stronger due to program 
managers having the ability to causally trace from specific alternatives 
through their impacts on specific subprocesses and operations to 
performance.  
 Justifications of an AoA decisions can become more robust because 
they can reflect an analysis of a wider range of alternatives and more 
alternatives.   
 Results of AoA can become more consistent through the use of a 
single, integrated model of system operations and KVA metrics instead 
of separate operations and value-added models.  
 System dynamics/KVA models may be used to baseline product 
performance during the acquisition process. Performance of the 
product can be tracked over time and used to improve the model and, 
thereby, performance forecasts and AoA later in acquisition.  
 Program management will select better alternatives due to the 
implications for practice listed in the bullets immediately above. This 
will generate more effective and potentially cheaper materiel solutions.  
In addition, improving the AoA and acquisition through integrated system 
dynamics/KVA models can improve CONOPS. The Javelin case study provides a 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 52 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
tactics and strategy. Upon receipt and use of Javelin, operators expressed surprise 
that its range was twice that of the weapon it replaced. That increased range 
initiated improvements to tactics, techniques, and procedures (ttp) such as the use 
of Javelin to detonate improvised explosive devices. This, in turn, could generate 
changes to strategies. Accurate forecasts of product subprocess performance (e.g., 
accuracy at longer range) could be used to plan CONOPS improvements before 
product delivery.  
It is important to note that the purpose of the simulations of operations 
developed and illustrated in the current work was to capture the relative benefits and 
costs of different materiel alternatives, not to simulate the impacts of operations on 
opposing forces. The usefulness of models can only be judged in relation to the 
specific purpose for which they are built (Sterman, 2000). Therefore, because the 
purpose of integrated system dynamics/KVA models is to improve AoA, those 
models should be developed, assessed, and used separately from force-on-force 
and other simulations of operations developed for other purposes.   
Future Work 
The current proof-of-concept work has demonstrated the potential of 
integrated system dynamics/KVA models to improve an Analysis of Alternatives and 
acquisition. Additional research can extend this work toward implementation and 
expanded application. Opportunities include the following:  
 Modeling a specific acquisition program in support of its Analysis of 
Alternatives process can develop and demonstrate the capability of 
operationalizing the approach tested here.  
 If important uncertainties in system operations are incorporated into 
the system dynamics model, then it can be used to generate 
distributions of KVA productivities. These can be used to estimate the 
volatilities used in real options analysis, which has been demonstrated 
to be useful in DoD acquisition.   
 The application of integrated system dynamics/KVA modeling to DoD 
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to generate forecasts of performance and KVA ratios during 
acquisition, comparing those forecasts with actual operations, and 
using the results to improve the model fidelity with the system. The 
improved model can then be used to analyze proposed changes or 
replacement of the system throughout its lifecycle.  
The Analysis of Alternatives is a particularly challenging part of DoD 
acquisition. Integrating system dynamics modeling and the Knowldege Value Added 
approach has been shown to be capable of improving that analysis and, thereby, 
alternative selection. Adapting this approach can significantly change and improve 
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Appendix A. The System Dynamics Model  
Max asset range available=RANDOM UNIFORM(0, 1, 9876)  ~ Dmnl 
Asset available range="Asset max. range"*Max asset range available 
~ NauticalMiles 
~ | 
"Avail Range: Traget distance from base ratio"=(Asset available range/Target 
distance fr base)+0.01 ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
Confirm kill rate=Battlefield assessment rate*Fraction not confirmed kill  
~ target/Minute 
~ | 
Change Battlefliedl assessment capacity applied=Max(-0.5*Battlefield assessment 
capacity applied,Avg Battlefield assessment delay*Sesnativity of Battlefield 
assessment capability to Avg Battlefield assessment delay) 
~ (targets/Minute)/Minute 
~ | 
Fraction not confirmed kill= Min(1,"p(incomplete kill)"+"p(lose target after 
miss)"+"p(missed but not lost)") ~  
~ | 
"Dash speed: Target speed ratio"=(Asset dash speed/Target speed)+1 ~ Dmnl 
~  
"p(not lose target)"= "Range-p(not lose) function"("Avail Range: Traget distance from 
base ratio") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Range-p(not lose) function"( [(0,0)-
(2,1)],(0,0),(0.740061,0.0482456),(0.911315,0.127193),(1.34557,0.912281),(1.5596
3,0.951754),(1.85933,0.951754))  ~ | 
 
"Payload: Lethal payload ratio"=(Asset payload/Lethal payload)+0.01 ~ Dmnl 
~ | 












Lethal payload=RANDOM UNIFORM( 400, 1000, 1234) ~ lbs 
~ | 
"p(hit target)"="Speed-p(hit) function"("Dash speed: Target speed ratio") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"p(kill target if hit)"= "Paylod - p(kill) function"("Payload: Lethal payload ratio")  
~ Dmnl 
~ | 
Target speed= RANDOM UNIFORM(50, 250, 1234) ~ knots 
~  
Target distance fr base=RANDOM UNIFORM(400, 1100, 1234) 
~ NauticalMiles 
~ | 
Mission fraction sent to asset=Min(1,Max(0,Reference Mission fraction sent to 
asset+(Targets in fire mission development*Sensativity of Mission Fraction Sent to 
Asset to Backlog)))  ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Fire support - missions not assigned to asset"=Fire support coordination completion 
rate-Fire support coordination to asset rate ~ target/Minute 
~ | 
Targets in battlefield assessment backlog= INTEG ( Engage target rate-Confirm 
kill rate-Incomplete kill rate-Miss target but have not lost target rate-Lose target after 
miss rate,0) ~ targets 
~ | 
Total confirmed target kills= INTEG (Confirm kill rate,0) ~ targets 
~ | 
Avg Battlefield assessment delay=ZIDZ(Targets in battlefield assessment 
backlog,Confirm kill rate)~ Minute 
~ | 
Targets in fire support coordination= INTEG (Acquire target completion rate-Fire 
support coordination to asset rate-"Fire support - missions not assigned to asset",0) 
~ targets 
~ | 
Total targets not assigned to asset= INTEG ("Fire support - missions not assigned to 
asset",0)  ~ targets 
~ | 
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~ | 
Target ID rate=IF THEN ELSE(Time<480, 5, 0) ~ targets/Minute 
~ | 
"Asset max. range"=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','c24') 
~ NauticalMiles 
~ | 
Asset dash speed=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','c23') ~ knots 
~ | 
Cumm Project Learning Time earned= INTEG (Earn Project Learning Time,0) 
~ LThours 
~ | 
Cumm Project Touch time spent= INTEG (Spend Project Touch Time,0) 
~ TThours 
~ | 
Fire support coordination completion rate= Min(Fire support coordination 
capacity applied,Targets in fire support coordination/Avg Fire support coordination 
duration)  ~ targets/Minute 
~ | 
Fire support coordination to asset rate=Fire support coordination completion 
rate*Mission fraction sent to asset ~ targets/Minute 
~ | 
Reference Mission fraction sent to asset=GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','c16') ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
Spend engagement touch time=Engage target rate*Avg Engagement duration*"unit 
Touch Time hours spent per duration minute (targets)" ~ TThours/minutes 
~ | 
Spend fire mission development touch time= Fire mission completion rate*Avg 
Fire mission development duration*"unit Touch Time hours spent per duration 
minute (targets)"  ~  TThours/minutes 
~ | 
Earn Project Learning Time="Earn LT - acquire targets"+"Earn LT - Battlefield 
assessment"+"Earn LT - Engage targets"+"Earn LT - Fire mission 
development"+"Earn LT - Fire support coordination"+"Earn LT - Move assets"  
~ LThours/Minute 
~ | 
Targets in fire mission development= INTEG (+Fire support coordination to asset 








Sensativity of Mission Fraction Sent to Asset to Backlog=-0.05 ~ 1/targets 
~  
Spend Project Touch Time=Spend battle assessment touch time+Spend 
engagement touch time+Spend fire mission development touch 
time+Spend fire support coordination touch time+Spend target 
acquisition touch time+Total spend move asset touch time ~
 TThours/minutes 
~ | 
"Earn revenue - Fire mission development"= Fire mission completion rate*"Unit 
revenue - Fire mission development" ~ kdollars/Minute 
~ | 
"Earn LT - Move assets"=Total move asset rate*Move asset unit learning time*"Avg 
no. of targets that each asset can engage at once" ~ LThours/Minute 
~ | 
Fire mission completion rate=Min(Fire mission development capacity 
applied,Targets in fire mission development/Avg Fire mission development duration) 
~ targets/Minute 
~ | 
Project productivity=XIDZ(Cumm Project Learning Time earned,(Cumm Project 
Touch time spent*Relative value of LT compared to TT),1) ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
Engage target rate=Min(Target engagement backlog,Targets assets on station can 
engage)/Avg Engagement duration~ targets/Minute 
~  
Assets in route to Base= INTEG (Assets leave station for base rate-Assets arriving 
at base rate,0)  ~ Assets 
~ | 
Assets arrive at station rate=Assets in route to Station/Avg travel time to or from 
station  ~ Assets/Minute 
~ | 
Assets arriving at base rate=Assets in route to Base/Avg travel time to or from 
station ~ Assets/Minute 
~ | 
Assets at Base= INTEG (Assets arriving at base rate-Assets leaving base for station 
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~ | 
Avg travel time to or from station=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','m7') 
~ Minute 
~ | 
Assets leave station for base rate=Assets on Station/Avg time on station 
~  Assets/Minute 
~ | 
Assets leaving base for station rate=Assets at Base/Avg time at base 
~ Assets/Minute 
~ | 
Avg time at base=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','m11') ~ Minute 
~ Assumed to be the average time from arrival of the asset at the base 
that \is required to refuel and reload asset and have it depart from 
base. 
| 
Incomplete kill rate=Battlefield assessment rate*"p(incomplete kill)" 
~ targets/Minute 
~ | 
"Spend move asset touch time-base to station"=Assets leaving base for station 
rate*Avg travel time to or from station*"unit Touch Time hours spent per duration 
minute (assets)" ~ TThours/minutes 
~ | 
"Spend move asset touch time-station to base"=Assets leave station for base 
rate*Avg travel time to or from station*"unit Touch Time hours spent per duration 
minute (assets)" TThours/minutes 
~ | 




Total move asset rate=Assets leave station for base rate+Assets arriving at base 
rate  ~ Assets/Minute 
~ | 
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~ | 
Targets being acquired= INTEG (+Target ID rate+Lose target after miss rate-Acquire 
target completion rate,0) ~ targets 
~ | 
Targets assets on station can engage=INTEGER(Assets on Station*"Avg no. of 
targets that each asset can engage at once") ~ targets 
~ | 
"p(missed but not lost)"=(1-"p(hit target)")*(1-"p(not lose target)") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"p(incomplete kill)"="p(hit target)"*(1-"p(kill target if hit)") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"p(lose target after miss)"=(1-"p(hit target)")*(1-"p(not lose target)") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
Battlefield assessment capacity applied= INTEG (+Change Battlefliedl assessment 
capacity applied,Reference Battlefield assessment capability) ~ target/Minute 
~ | 
Battlefield assessment rate=Min(Battlefield assessment capacity applied,Targets in 
battlefield assessment backlog/Avg Battle assessment duration) ~ target/Minute 
~ | 
"Cumm Learning Time - acquire targets"= INTEG ("Earn LT - acquire targets",0) 
~ LThours 
~ | 
Spend fire support coordination touch time=(Fire support coordination to asset 
rate*Mission fraction sent to asset)*Avg Fire support coordination duration*"unit 
Touch Time hours spent per duration minute (targets)" ~ TThours/minutes 
~ | 
"Cumm Learning Time - engage targets"= INTEG ("Earn LT - Engage targets",0) 
~ LThours 
~ | 
"Cumm Learning Time - Fire mission development"= INTEG ("Earn LT - Fire mission 
development", 0) ~ LThours 
~ | 
Spend target acquisition touch time=(Acquire target completion rate*Mission fraction 
sent to asset)*Avg Target acquisition duration*"unit Touch Time hours spent per 
duration minute (targets)" ~ TThours/minutes 
~ | 








Sensitivity of Battlefield assessment capability to Avg Battlefield assessment 
delay=0.01 ~ ((targets/Minute)/Minute)/Minute 
~ | 
"Earn LT - acquire targets"=(Acquire target completion rate*Mission fraction sent to 
asset)*Acquire target unit learning time ~ LThours/Minute 
~  
"Earn LT - Battlefield assessment"=Battlefield assessment rate*Battle assessment 
unit learning time ~ LThours/Minute 
~ | 
"Earn LT - Engage targets"=Engage target rate*Target engagement unit learning 
time ~ LThours/Minute 
~ | 
"Productivity - Move assets"=ZIDZ("Cumm Learning Time - Move assets",("Cumm 
Touch Time - Move assets"*Relative value of LT compared to TT)) ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Earn LT - Fire mission development"=Fire mission completion rate*Fire mission unit 
learning time ~ LThours/Minute 
~ | 
"Earn LT - Fire support coordination"=(Fire support coordination to asset 
rate*Mission fraction sent to asset)*Fire support coordination unit learning time 
~ LThours/Minute 
~ | 
"Cumm Learning Time - Battlefield assessment"= INTEG ("Earn LT - Battlefield 
assessment",0) ~ LThours 
~ | 
Reference Battlefield assessment capability=GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','g5') ~ targets/Minute 
~  
Relative value of LT compared to TT=1 ~ LThours/TThours 
~ | 
"Productivity - Engage targets"=ZIDZ("Cumm Learning Time - engage 
targets",("Cumm Touch Time - Engage targets"*Relative value of LT compared to 
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~ | 
"Productivity - Acquire targets"=ZIDZ("Cumm Learning Time - acquire 
targets",("Cumm Touch Time - Target acquisition"*Relative value of LT compared to 
TT)) ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Cumm Learning Time - Fire support coordination"= INTEG ("Earn LT - Fire support 
coordination",0) ~ LThours 
~ | 
"Productivity - Fire mission development"=ZIDZ("Cumm Learning Time - Fire 
mission development",("Cumm Touch time - Fire mission development"*Relative 
value of LT compared to TT)) ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Productivity - Fire support coordination"=ZIDZ("Cumm Learning Time - Fire support 
coordination",("Cumm Touch time - Fire support coordination"*Relative value of LT 
compared to TT)) ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Productivity - Battlefield assessment"=ZIDZ("Cumm Learning Time - Battlefield 
assessment",("Cumm Touch Time - Battlefield assessment"*Relative value of LT 
compared to TT)) ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Cumm work cost - Battlefield assessment"="Cumm Touch Time - Battlefield 
assessment"*"Hourly work cost - Battlefield assessment" ~ kdollars 
~ | 
"Cumm work cost - Engage target"="Cumm Touch Time - Engage targets"*"Hourly 
work cost - engage target" ~ kdollars 
~ | 
"Cumm work cost - fire mission development"="Cumm Touch time - Fire mission 
development"*"Hourly work cost - Fire mission development" ~ kdollars 
~ | 
"Cumm work cost - Fire support coordination"="Cumm Touch time - Fire support 
coordination"*"Hourly work cost - Fire support coordination" ~ kdollars 
~ | 
"Cumm work cost - Move launchers"="Cumm Touch Time - Move assets"*"Hourly 
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~ | 
Cumm Fire mission development $ productivity=ZIDZ("Cumm revenue - Fire mission 
development","Cumm work cost - fire mission development") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
Cumm Fire support coordination $ productivity=ZIDZ("Cumm revenue - Fire support 
coordination","Cumm work cost - Fire support coordination") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Earn revenue - engage target"=Engage target rate*"Unit revenue - engage target" 
~ kdollars/Minute 
~ | 
"Hourly work cost - engage target"=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','i8') 
~ kdollars/TThour 
~ | 
"Hourly work cost - Fire mission development"=GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','i6') ~ kdollars/TThour 
~ | 
"Earn revenue - Move launchers"=Total move asset rate*("Unit revenue - Move 
launchers"*"Avg no. of targets that each asset can engage at once") 
~ kdollars/Minute 
~ | 
"Hourly work cost - Battlefield assessment"=GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','i9') ~ kdollars/TThour 
~ | 
Cumm Battle assessment $ productivity=ZIDZ("Cumm revenue - Battlefield 
assessment","Cumm work cost - Battlefield assessment") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Cumm work cost - Acquire target"="Cumm Touch Time - Target acquisition"*"Hourly 
work cost - Acquire target" ~ kdollars 
~ | 
Cumm target engagement $ productivity=ZIDZ("Cumm revenue - engage 
target","Cumm work cost - Engage target") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
Cumm Acquire target $ productivity=ZIDZ("Cumm revenue - Acquire target","Cumm 
work cost - Acquire target") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Hourly work cost - Fire support coordination"=GET XLS 
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~ | 
Cumm move launcher $ prodictivity=ZIDZ("Cumm revenue - Move 
launchers","Cumm work cost - Move launchers") ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Hourly work cost - Move launchers"=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','i7') 
~ kdollars/TThour 
~ | 
"Cumm revenue - Acquire target"= INTEG ( "Earn revenue - Acquire target",0) 
~ kdollars 
~ | 
"Cumm revenue - Fire mission development"= INTEG ("Earn revenue - Fire mission 
development", 0) ~ kdollars 
~ | 
"Cumm revenue - Fire support coordination"= INTEG ("Earn revenue - Fire support 
coordination",0) ~ kdollars 
~ | 
"Cumm revenue - Move launchers"= INTEG ("Earn revenue - Move launchers",0)
 kdollars 
~ | 
"Cumm revenue - Battlefield assessment"= INTEG ("Earn revenue - Battlefield 
assessment",0)  ~ kdollars 
~ | 
"Earn revenue - Acquire target"=Acquire target completion rate*"Unit revenue- 
Acquire targets"  ~ kdollars/Minute 
~ | 
"Earn revenue - Battlefield assessment"=Battlefield assessment rate*"Unit revenue - 
battlefield assessment" ~ kdollars/Minute 
~ | 
"Earn revenue - Fire support coordination"=Fire support coordination to asset 
rate*"Unit revenue - Fire support coordination"  ~ kdollars/Minute 
~ | 
 
Total process learning time=Acquire target unit learning time+Battle assessment unit 
learning time+Target engagement unit learning time+Fire mission unit learning 
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~ | 
"Cumm revenue - engage target"= INTEG ("Earn revenue - engage target",0)~
 kdollars 
~ | 
"Revenue fraction - Engage target"=Target engagement unit learning time/Total 
process learning time ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Hourly work cost - Acquire target"= GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','i4') ~ kdollars/TThour 
~ | 
"Revenue fraction - Battlefield assessment"= Battle assessment unit learning 
time/Total process learning time ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Revenue fraction - Fire mission development"=Fire mission unit learning time/Total 
process learning time ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Revenue fraction - Fire support coordination"=Fire support coordination unit 
learning time/Total process learning time ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Revenue fraction - move launchers"=Move asset unit learning time/Total process 
learning time  ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Revenue fraction - Acquire target"= Acquire target unit learning time/Total 
process learning time ~ Dmnl 
~ | 
"Unit revenue- Acquire targets"="Revenue fraction - Acquire target"*Unit revenue of 
process ~ kdollars/target 
~ | 
"Unit revenue - engage target"="Revenue fraction - Engage target"*Unit revenue of 
process ~ kdollars/target 
~ | 
"Unit revenue - Move launchers"="Revenue fraction - move launchers"*Unit revenue 
of process  ~ kdollars/target 
~ | 
"Unit revenue - battlefield assessment"="Revenue fraction - Battlefield 
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~ | 
"Unit revenue - Fire support coordination"="Revenue fraction - Fire support 
coordination"*Unit revenue of process ~ kdollars/target 
~ | 
Unit revenue of process=1e+006 ~ kdollars/target 
~ | 
"Unit revenue - Fire mission development"="Revenue fraction - Fire mission 
development"*Unit revenue of process ~ kdollars/target 
~ | 
Number of assets applied=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','G7')  
~ Assets 
~ | 
Spend battle assessment touch time=Battlefield assessment rate*Avg Battle 
assessment duration*"unit Touch Time hours spent per duration minute (targets)" 
~ TThours/minutes 
~ | 
"unit Touch Time hours spent per duration minute (targets)"=0.0176667 
TThours/(minutes*target) ~ 1   60th of an hour 
 
Total spend move asset touch time="Spend move asset touch time-station to 
base"+"Spend move asset touch time-base to station" ~
 TThours/minutes 
~ | 
"unit Touch Time hours spent per duration minute (assets)"=0.0176667 
~ TThours/(asset*minutes) ~ 1 60th of an hour 
| 
Target engagement unit learning time=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','f8') 
~ LThours/target 
~ | 
"Avg no. of targets that each asset can engage at once"=5 ~ targets/asset 
~ | 
Acquire target completion rate=Min(Target acquisition capacity applied,Targets 
being acquired/Avg Target acquisition duration) ~ targets/Minute 
~ | 
Acquire target unit learning time=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','f4') 
~ LThours/target 
~ | 
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~ | 
Fire mission unit learning time=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','f6') 
~ LThours/target 
~  
Target engagement backlog= INTEG (+Fire mission completion rate+Incomplete kill 
rate-Engage target rate,0)  ~ targets 
~ | 
Avg time on station=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','m5') ~ Minute 
~ | 
Avg Battle assessment duration=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','e9') 
~ Minute 
~ | 
"Cumm Touch Time - Battlefield assessment"= INTEG (Spend battle assessment 
touch time,0)  ~ TThours 
~ | 
Avg Engagement duration=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','e8') 
~ Minute 
~ | 
"Cumm Touch Time - Engage targets"= INTEG (Spend engagement touch time,0) 
~ TThours 
~ | 
Fire mission development capacity applied=GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','g6')  ~ targets/Minute 
~ | 
Avg Fire mission development duration=GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','e6') ~ Minute 
~ | 
"Cumm Touch time - Fire mission development"= INTEG (Spend fire mission 
development touch time,0)  ~ TThours 
~ | 
Fire support coordination capacity applied=GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','g5') ~ targets/Minute 
~ | 
Avg Fire support coordination duration=GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','e5') ~ Minute 
~ | 
"Cumm Touch time - Fire support coordination"= INTEG (Spend fire support 
coordination touch time,0)  ~ TThours 
~ | 
Fire support coordination unit learning time=GET XLS 
CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','f5') ~ LThours/target 
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Assets on Station= INTEG (Assets arrive at station rate-Assets leave station for 
base rate,0) ~ Assets 
~ | 
Assets in route to Station= INTEG (+Assets leaving base for station rate-Assets 
arrive at station rate,0) ~ Assets 
~ | 
Move asset unit learning time=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','f7')  
~ LThours/target 
~ | 
"Cumm Touch Time - Move assets"= INTEG (Total spend move asset touch time, 0) 
~ TThours 
~  
Target acquisition capacity applied=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','G4') 
~ targets/Minute 
~ | 
Avg Target acquisition duration=GET XLS CONSTANTS('Input.xls','Input','e4') 
~ Minute 
~ | 
"Cumm Touch Time - Target acquisition"= INTEG (Spend target acquisition touch 
time,0) ~ TThours 
~ | 
Simulation Control Parameters 
FINAL TIME  = 900 Minute ~ The final time for the simulation. 
INITIAL TIME  = 0~ Minute ~ The initial time for the simulation. 
SAVEPER  = 0.25~ Minute [0,?]~ The frequency with which output is stored. 
TIME STEP  = 0.125 Minute [0,?]~ The time step for the simulation.
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Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
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Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
  
Initial Distribution List 
1. Defense Technical Information Center       2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944; Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013        2 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5100 
3. Research Office, Code 09          1 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5138 
4. William R. Gates             1 
Dean, GSBPP 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943 
5. Stephen Mehay             1 
Associate Dean for Research, GB 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943 
6. David N Ford             1 
Research Associate Professor, GB 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943 
7. Thomas J. Housel             1 
Professor, GB 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943 
8. John T. Dillard             1 
Senior Lecturer, GB 




















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
